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The paper starts from the observation  of three related facts about Poland after its successful
1990 stabilization  and liberalization: t faced high wage and pension claims, it was confronted  with a
rising number of unemployed  workers and pensioners, and it experienced  difficulties  with its
government  budget, especially  in 1991 and 1992. The objective  of this paper is to identify and
measure the effects of such developments  on the government  budget.  These effects are then  judged in
light of the objectives  of the economic  transformation  of Poland: equitable and sustainable  growth in
a market economy.
The idea that labor market disequilibria  created an excessive  burden for public finances  must
be understood correctly. It has many aspects, each of which is analyzed  by comparing actual
outcomes  with counterfactual  simulations.
The first section of the paper outlines  the disequilibria  in the labor market.  Section  2 studies
their implications  in terms of the government's revenue gains and losses. Section  3 is devoted to
workers' pensions, looking  both at the number  of beneficiaries  and at the benefits. Section  4 shows
the evolution of wages and other income-related  expenditures  in government  spending.
The budgetary  pressures to the high income claims of workers and pensioners  an evaluated  in
section  5.  Alternative  policy options are also sketched  there.  Section 6 then evaluates  quantitatively
the redistributive  activities of the government  budget. A summary  table shows that the reforms have
brought only slow and marginal reductions  in the budget deficit, total expenditure, or the tax burden.
Efficiency  gains in the Polish economy  must be sought in the different composition  of revenue and
expenditure,  or in other aspects  of reform. Section 7 concludes.
11. DISEQUILIBRIUM  IN WAGES, PENSIONS,  AND EMPLOYMENT
Before quantifying  the revenue and expenditure  effects of the high income claims, it is useful
to describe  briefly the disequilibrium  in the labor market.  The rise of the "producer" wage in Poland
is striking after the 1990  stabilization;  converting nominal wages at the official  exchange rate would
give the same  picture (figure 1).  The "consumer"  wage (the producer wage deflated  by the consumer
price index, see table 5),  however, remained  basically  constant after the 1990 stabilization. The
divergent evolution of the consumer  wage reflects the huge price distortion  inherited by the Polish
economy, as well as major changes in the tax system.  Figure 1 shows clearly the too early growth of
producer price-deflated  wages relative to GDP growth, and the growing  payroll tax wedge required to
finance  the ensuing unemployment  and retirement of workers.
The evolution of wages can be judged only on the basis of productivity  changes and changes
in the opportunity  cost of labor.  Productivity  fell in 1990 and 1991 because output declined  faster
than employment. Productivity  rose again after 1992, and employment  had to wait until 1994  to stop
falling.  These productivity  changes  do not seem  to justify the timing of the wage increases  in late
1990  and of 1991. The cost of labor was affected  not only by rising nominal wages and the slower
increase of the producer price index, but it was also affected  by a sharp increase in social security
contributions in 1990 and 1992.
The huge difference  between  available labor and employed labor since 1991 indicates  that
labor was paid above its opportunity  cost. Early retirees and unemployed  workers together amount to
more than 4 million people (figure 2).  This figure can hardly be explained  by mismatch, frictional
job search, or the excessive  cost of retraining, while rejecting  high wages. Actually, most studies of
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|  Real  GP growth  E3 Series2  oDPW87:  PPI deflated wage  a  TDPW87:  DPW87 +tax  wedge|the labor market conclude  that insider power cannot be rejected as a determinant  of the high wage
settlements.
New entries kept the size of the labor force constant. Entering outsiders maintained some
effective  pressure on insiders, despite the fact that some unemployed  outsiders sank into long-term
unemployment. Another piece of evidence showing  that labor was paid more than its opportunity
cost in many state firms is the difference  between average wages in the economy and in the private
sector (table 1).
The Central Statistical  Office, Glowny Urzad  Statystyczny  (GUS)  reports that employment
(zatrudnienie)  fell from 12 million in 1989 to 9 million in 1993. Thanks to self-employment,  labor
income earners outside of private agriculture  (pracujacy)  fell only from 12.5 million to 11 million.
Productivity  gains at such an employment  cost indicate that some labor is paid above its opportunity
cost.  The economy  has not become more productive, rather income is distributed  differently:
employed workers earn larger gross wages and pay more taxes. The others earn benefits.
Table 1: Average  private sector  wages relative to average wages in the economy, 1993-95 (percent)
Relative Average Gross Wage in  1993a  1993b  1994b  1994e  1995c
Private  Firms
All sectors  87.8  94.4  92.6  92.5  94.5
82.4  88.0  83.3  84.3  86.0
Industrial workers
Note:  Figures one for average monthly gross wages.
a  Covers all workers.
b  Covers only the workers employed in reporting enterprises.
c  Same as b, but 9-month  averages (Jan.-Sept.).




￿  K  K￿ 2  ￿
0  K￿j -I-  ￿  K
K  *  K  ￿
4*>  K>  K  ￿  K>  ￿1.
o  *K  K*  ￿**￿
-t  »  K  ￿K*K￿K  *￿i￿K  ￿  **K￿K**  ￿  *K  K  Ks>'  ￿
C)  ￿K  *K  K  K  ￿  *  K￿  K￿  1* KK>
KK￿K￿  KKIK  K  K  AK»  K  ￿*K>  /  >  K  K>
K I  dK>  ￿  K  d  ￿  > 
4
KK  >K>
K  **P*  K
- 1K  I￿  ￿K  K￿￿K  >K*K*  K  ;K>￿>￿￿  K￿  0
￿  ￿4K  K*»>IK  >￿  ￿  >*K*  **  K*>  ￿*»￿  K  ￿K  *￿***  'K*  Kt*K￿I>  ￿  >*  K>  >￿  >￿  ￿>>  -t
K  K  >K  K  4I￿K  ￿  ￿KK￿  ￿  KK
J￿  ￿4￿K  K$K  K￿  K<*  ￿4  1K  >￿  /*￿K*  ￿  **￿KK￿  K  K  K*K*  K  K  C)
**  ***  K￿K  ￿jK  *K
*KK*K  K*￿  K  K  KKKKK*  ￿KK  *K￿*
KKK>  ￿  K  *K  *KK￿*  K￿*  K>>K*
K>  **K*  KKK,￿»*KR  1I￿  K
K  >KI»*￿>  »  KKK  A  K
K K  KK>K>KKK  **￿KK￿*￿KKK  *K  I  KKk  ￿  *IKK  >K>KK  >￿  >K  K*K  K￿  ￿<  K>
KK>K  **K*>￿  >*K*  >  K>  K> 9
K  1￿> ￿  KKK  »  KK
KK  KK  >K»*  KK  KK￿K/  KK  K>  K  I  II  KK  I
K  K*K￿K  ￿  >  >KIKK  4  >KK  >  ￿  KK  K>  »  K
I  >  »K￿  >KK>  MI  1￿  IKb  ￿KK  ￿  K  K  >￿  0
K>  1MIKK 11 1>4 4  K KM  K1￿  »  >KKK 4  >K  K  K>KMKM  >4>>44»>  K￿>  >KKK  4K  ￿  K
K  K>  ￿  I  >  >KKIKKKK  >K>  >K>K
K>  KKMK  K  1￿K»  >  KK  »  Mi 
4
K  I  IKKKK  K￿
K>  >44KKK  >K>>  >>K>  ￿  K  >KK  >14»  4  ￿  K>  K  K  K>  K>
>2k>  »»>KJ  K>KK>  3￿»  K￿j.>  >Kj  j￿K  ￿>»»>  ￿>  ￿>  <  >  K  KKK»  K>  K  > K>  K>K>KK>
»>KK  K  K»>  KK  K  >  K  >>  >1  >K￿>4
>1>￿  K4￿  >>  K  ￿>  ￿  »>  K  144>  Kj￿>  KK￿I.  »4>K
K»  >K>￿>￿  >  >4K»»  41K  >41K>  *i1>4￿  >4K>  >1  ￿>  K  K  K  K»»  4> 1>44141  >>KK>K»  KK  1  KKK
00  >￿0  KK»>  KM  KI  K  K￿  »K»>  V  K>4K>4KK￿11  KK44K  K  K  KKK  K>  K  K  K4 K
KK  »  K  »>  >  »>>-»K  >>>»  >414  /4K>  /»KKK»  K»>  K  »  K1> KK»4K  AK>  4K  ￿4i K4K»  KK>  KK>  K>  K»> >KK>
K>  KK>IK>K>K>K>￿KK>411KK11K>  »»K»  KK  K>>»  K  »K>  K  ￿»  1K  ￿K
1  11;>  *1>4K>  >K>KK4KK>KK41K  44  >44> K>  K  »  »K  >>  »  >K>
1K> K/K  K  K>
K  »KK  Al  K>K
4 K ￿ KKjK￿  >K  >  4>  »  KK  K>  K>>  >1K  K  K>
>>I>￿K 1 >K>  KK￿K>41K4>41IM2M  >4
1K￿  >14.>*  »  I  > >1K »K4 4 >»K» 
4
K4 K  >  K» ￿A>  K»>  4 K K>  K
>1>  >KKK  K>  IK>KK  KK> KK  fl
K>  *  K  K»>  >K  K»KK  I  ￿>  KK  K
KKK  >K  »»>»>KK￿  K>  >  »1>  4>  KKKL1K42￿K4KI*KMI1KKK44I  »>  KKK￿>￿  >K  K 
4KK  K»  >KK  >1>
K>K  »KKK4
K>  K>  >  >  K  K»
>44>  K￿  >  K>  K  K>￿  »>KK>￿  >411>  K414>K»KKKKK  >  K»  K  K  KIK»>>>  K  >1>4  KK  K  >4>  >K
KKK>>41KK»  /41>  *  ￿4  K  4K  »>KKK  1K  K  >4K
K  K  *1  ￿i￿K  *  K  K>  K  >￿>
KIKIK  KK  >KK 4KKKKKK￿K>KKK4MK  41  KK>  ￿  >￿  >1  >44 >4>  >1  >>>1»:  K4>>KK»>.  IKKK»4M1>  ￿I>  »»>  K  4/»  »>  K  >K  >K
K  >1  IK>KK4>KM4>K14K  K»  »  K  KKM>K  >K4.>  K>  K>  K>  K K
K  K4KK»>»41»  K>  >KK»￿  ￿l>>  K»
KKK  K  KlI￿￿>K>1  >KK»I» >»  K  >￿K  »  K  >>  KKK  4K>
K  K>>  K￿  >1K  KKK>  K  K >￿K￿4
>K4￿￿  KM￿4￿  I  >KKK  *7K»A  K￿»K￿  4>  >￿1>  *  K  KKK  *  K>  »K  A  K  K  KK  K>
K KK >4
TM
K  KIKI KKK>1>K>KKK>KA>K1>44K  >K  K>  K  1  >￿>  II  K
4
>4K  >K  K>
>IKKKK4KK  KKK>>￿.»K>  >  >»  >K￿  >KK  >KK>  KK  KKKK  >  >K  »  4  >4K
">0  »>￿  K  K  KKK>IKKMK>KI>KK4KK>i>K »»  »K>1>  K  K»»  K  >  K  K»» »»  »>
>  KKMK KK￿KK>  K>KKK>>K4  41  I1>￿  K  K
>K>  KK  *  K  K»KKK1￿K>  >/4K>%K  11  K  *  K>￿  44
1K»>»>  K
4 4>
»  MIK»14  441>>  41<  >AK  KII>  4  >  >K  MI »4  >K  A4>  K>  »>  >K»  ￿>
<K>»»>  > 4. IlK  >1>  K  >4>  >
1 >
IK  ￿>  KK  KKI >1  >1  ￿KK>  KKA
IKK  >14K>  MI  > 
14
4K  >￿<￿  4
KMM4  »  K>  KK  K  KK> >4  K KI»  K>/4K>  >MKK
K>  KKKKKKKKK  KK  ￿>  »  44K  >  1> K
K>  K  K￿K  K  >K>  »  K  >  »»>»>  K>  K» K> K  K>>  K>  KKK
>4  4K  KKK>KKKK>  MKKK>KKK  >4>  >4K  4K>￿K  K>  K  K>>»  ￿>  >K>K  IKK>K4KK  K>
K K  >1>  >4  KKI>  4  >4KK  >IKK>K> »K>>  K  I»> KKK>K K» >  >1  K  I  »>K 
14K
K>>>  > >  llK￿  KKKK  KKKK>  K  K  >14K  >»  K  KK>  K>  > >  K>  K  K  KM
K»»  K>>  K  K  KKKK  K  KKKK  K>KK>  KK*  KK»  /»KK  >>  K  K  >»  K>  KK  K»  K
>4K  1K>  4K  >KKK￿  »  14» >4  >»K 4 K  KI  >>K  >>
>>>  >4  >KM>K  'K  >44  >￿4  4K  > KK  KKK  KIK  4  KKK>  K  K  K  '>￿ K￿  K
K>>  K  >  K>  4K  >KKKK>K  KK  'K»»>  >KKK  'K  KK  1» 1*  >1>  K  >K  >￿  K>
KK  IK  >￿  K  KKKK  >KK  >K>K>  K  >￿  IK  K  >  K  K>  K  KK*  K>  >4K  K
1>1>»»  41>  ￿  >>K  >14K> 44  K  >  K>  ￿  >1>  >  K.>  >  K
K  »> 
1￿
K>  >4  >￿  1>1  K  >  4> 1>4>  >￿  K»  ￿  >1>  K  >>  >￿  K
>  »»K>  >  K»  K>  K>  >KK  >4>>>K4  4.»  >4>1>  >  >  >1  K  K  KK>>KK>
K  K  K  >KKK»  KKKK  K>  K  >>KK>  KK>K
K>  4  >»  »>  KM  41  >4  K44  >KKKK  >￿  K  >￿K￿»  4K>￿
K>>  K K>  K  K￿>￿￿K  KKKK  K  K  K  KKKt..)  K  K  >￿  K>  »  »K  t￿)
K»»  K  K»￿  K>KK»  KK>>  KK>  »  K»  K>  K  KOO
KK 4K  KK￿￿  1 1K  >  K  KKKKK  K  K>>
>.>  >4K  K  KKKKKK  K  >KKK  >  KM  K  »  K  K>  ￿  K  >K  K
K»  KKK  K>  K>  >>  K  >￿  K  >K
K>  K >KK>  K >KKK  >K>K  >  14>  K>»>  >K>>>»  4  >1￿ KKKI  KKK  >  K»  K  I  K  K  Al
4>  »K  K»  K  >KK>  >  K>K.  »>  KK  14  >>>  »KK>K  KKK  K  K>K>  »KK>  4
K  4K  K￿,  ￿  ￿  >1￿  >>￿  ￿K>￿  >>  >  K  K  AK  1>  >￿  >4
K>  K  K
K  K>  »K  >K  >  *  K  KK>  >»>  I  >  >»>  >K  KThe unsustainability  of the wage path becomes  even clearer when the trade shock rising from
the Collapse of the Council for Mutual  Economic  Assistance (CMEA) is taken into account. The
negative  aggregate  demand impact of this shock could have reduced  both prices and output, while the
negative  aggregate supply effect, deriving from more expensive  raw materials, should have reduced
real wages. That the nominal and real producer wage per worker continued  to rise in 1991 is thus
remarkable. Polish exports, admittedly, did not fall much from their high 1990 level between 1991
and 1994-and  then started to rise again. Imports, however, rose continuously  in price and quantity.
The CMEA collapse can be seen as an aggregate  supply shock, worsened in some sectors (textiles
especially)  by a sectoral demand shock.
2. THE BUDGET  REVENUE  EFFECT  OF WAGE  INCREASES
High wages have several  effects on budget revenue. The first effect is a revenue gain from
applying the same rates (or higher ones in case of progressive taxation)  to higher wages, assuming
constant  employment. The second effect, which attracted a lot of attention, is the loss of profit taxes
because of declining  profits.  The third, and most important  effect is the reduction in total
employment,  and hence the reduction in the size of the tax-paying labor force. The final effect is the
needed increase in tax rates to collect enough revenue.
2.1. Effects at constant employment.
We first compare the direct effect of wage increases  on budget revenue, assuming constant
employment, with the indirect  profit tax loss. The net effect can be positive or negative, depending
on the relative taxation  of wages and profits, and their relative enforcement. Based on a comparison
of statutory rates, both Schaffer  (1993) and de Crombrugghe  (1994a) conclude  that the net effect may
have been positive (at constant  employment).
6Schaffer  (1993) estimates  the effect in the following  way.  Assuming
tj  = the tax rate on gross profits,
t2 = the combined  tax rate on net wages,
R  = total revenue from wage and profit taxes,
P  = profits [ = Sales - (1  +t2) wL]
L  = employment,
wL = net wage.
Government  revenue is:
R  =  tjP+t 2 wL
and the total derivative  of R with respect to the wage bill wL, taking into account that it is net of
taxes, gives
dR = d (wL)*  (t2-tl  t2-tj) .
This is positive if
t  >  tl/(1-tl)
where the right side can be called the "comparable  profit tax."  Following this methodology, table 2
reports comparable  tax rates for various years of the transition.
Schaffer  corrected  the statutory  tax rates to come closer to effective rates.  For 1990  he used a
profit tax rate of 37 percent, which corresponds  to the effective  rate paid by profit-reporting
enterprises. This gives a comparable  profit tax rate of 59 percent, which corresponds  to his effective
payroll tax rate, ignoring the excess wage tax.'  For 1991  he used an effective  profit tax rate of 30
1 On the  excess  wage  tax (called  PPWW  or popiwek)  see Coricelli  and Revenga  (1992)  and de Crombrugghe
and de Walque  (1996).
7percent, hence a "comparable  profit tax" of 43 percent and an unchanged  effective  net payroll tax rate
of 59 percent. He then estimated  that dR=d(wL)*0. I  1, thus a net revenue gain from wage
increases. 2
Table 2:  Gross Profit Tax Rates and Net Total Payroll Tax Rates, 1988-93
(percent)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Gross profit tax rate (tl)  65  40  40  40  40  40
Comparable  profit tax rate  186  67  67  67  67  67
(ttl/(I - td))
Overall net payroll tax rate (t 2)  58  58  67  67  76  78
Payroll tax  20  20  20  20  0  0
Average personal tax  0  0  0  0  20  21
Contribution  to ZUS  38  38  43  43  54  54
Contribution to FP  0  2  2  2  2  3
Note  ZUS = Zaklad Ubezpiecien  Socialnych; FP  Fundusz Pracy.
Statutory  rates in percent, converted into rates on net wages after 1991.
De Crombrugghe  (1994a)  grossed up the payroll tax rates before 1992 and came to the same conclusions.
The use of an effective  profit tax rate can be debated, especially in 199  1.  It transforms a
neutral tax revenue effect into a positive one.  Shaffer's low effective  profit tax rate is not
consequence  of a political decision  to increase the number of deductibles  or exemptions. Rather, it is
a consequence  of the fact that profit taxes are earned on only some of the enterprises. These are not
exogenous, though.  Some enterprises  may be loss-making  precisely because they raised wages.
Other enterprises  may have no incentive  to earn profits because they have no internal claimant  for
these profits. In that case their profits go to zero, and the effective  profit tax rate becomes  zero as
well.
2
2Schaffer  observes  that gross losses  were between  one-fourth  and one-third  of gross  profits  in 1991. So he
takes  as the marginal  tax rate 0.5*37  percent + 0.5(1/3*0  percent+2/3*37  percent)=30 percent.  Hence
for  1991  the wage revenue effect (t2-tlt2-tl)=(0.59-(0.3*0.59)-0.3)  =0.11.
8Since 1992  the fiscal treatment of profits [t1/(J-tl)] has been more favorable  than that of
wages (t2) (table 2).  The incentive  to make profits is higher, if profits can be distributed to a residual
claimant (for example, the workers) and not be taxed at the highest marginal  personal income tax
rate.  The tax revenue effect of wage increases is unambiguously  positive.
2.2. The effect at constant employment,  counterfactual  approach
Given the difficulty  of assessing  the tax revenue effect of the wage increases  of late 1990 and
1991, another approach  is to look directly at the actual tax revenue from wages. This revenue must
then be adjusted to maintain the (counterfactual)  assumption  of constant  employment. One way to
make this adjustment  is to multiply actual  revenue (as a share of GDP) by the ratio of 1989
employment  to actual employment. It is also necessary  to multiply the 1989  revenue by any tax rate
change that occurred between  the years.  The comparison  of these two counterfactual  observations
gives the maximum revenue gain from wage increases. 3
The counterfactual  payroll tax revenue at constant employment  and constant  tax rate jumped
to 14.9 in 1991 from 10.8 in 1990, or from 11.7 in 1989 (table 3).  This jump is a consequence  of
wage increases, or, more exactly, of the larger share of (higher)  wages in (a lower) GDP.  The
correction  coefficients  ensure constant employment  and constant  tax rates. 4 Thus the payroll tax's
revenue gain from higher wages in 1991 was 3.2 of GDP over the 1989  level, or 4.1 percent
compared with 1990. This gain has to be compared with the corresponding  loss in profit taxes (at
constant  profit tax rates).
3In  table  3, instead,  the counterfactual  is obtained  by dividing  the revenue  of the current  year  by the ratio  of
the current  tax  rate to that  of 1989  (and  by the ratio  of current  employment  to 1989  employment).
4  An alternative  would  be to divide  the 1989  actual  payroll  tax by the correction  coefficients  for 1991. For
Zaklad  Ubezpiecien  Socalnych  (ZUS),  this gives (8.4/1.07/0.88)=8.2,  for wage taxes  (3.3/1.22)=2.7. The
counterfactual  obtained  in this way should  then  be compared  with  the actual  revenue  of 1991. The difference
would  reflect  the effect  of the  wage  changes  at 1991  employment.  It is a gain  of (11.4-8.2)  =3.2 for ZUS.  The
profit  tax was  9.7 percent  in 1989  and 6.5 percent  in 1991-thus a loss  of 3.2 percent  of GDP, possibly  due in
part  to other  than-wages, like inflation.
9The profit tax rate had already changed  by 1989, so there is no need for a correction to
compare later years with 1989. The profit tax revenue was 9.7 percent of GDP in 1989, rose to 14
percent in 1990, and fell to 6.5 percent in 1991. Thus the revenue loss in 1991 was 3.2 percent of
GDP compared with that in 1989, and 7.5 percent compared with that in 1990.  The conclusion  for
1991  is that the profit tax loss wiped out the gain from higher wages at constant  employment: thus a
neutral effect in net.
A comparison  of profit taxes between 1988 and 1992 is also interesting. It is much less
sensitive  to the distribution  of the inflation  bias on profits between 1989 and 1991. In 1988  profit
taxes were 12.9 percent of GDP, while 1992's counterfactual  is 7.3 percent of GDP.  Thus more than
4 percent of GDP was lost on profit taxes for reasons other than temporary changes in inflation
(1989-91), or permanent  changes in tax rates or rules.
In subsequent  years profits continued to decline, and profit taxes declined  even more (see
1994, despite the small recovery in profits) while  wages became basically  stable in 1992. This
pattern suggests  that the explanation  for the profit decline  has to be sought elsewhere than in the wage
changes (see section 5).
2.3. Employment  effect
The revenue effect of the wage change did not arise at constant  employment  and constant  tax
rates: employment  fell and tax rates rose.  A vertical reading of table 3 reveals the importance  of
these two effects in any given year.  If the counterfactual  is higher than the actual revenue, it
10Table 3:  Tax. Revenue
(percent of GDP)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  994
Payment Tax Revenue at Baseline Employment
Actual payroll tax revenue  of which:  11.9  11.7  11.2  14.6  19.6  21.4  21.6
Wage tax or PIT4  3.5  3.3  3.0  2.6  6.3  7.7  8.2
ZUSb  8.4  8.4  8.0  11.4  12.9  12.9  12.6
FPc  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8
Correction  Coneficients
Constant  employment  coefficientd  - 1.0  1.07  1.17  1.27  1.33  1.34
for wage tax.'  - 1.0  1.09  1.22  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Constant  PIT coverage coefficient  - n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.38  0.38
Constant  tax rate coefficientg  - 1.0  0.87  0.87  0.76  0.74  -
For ZUS only  - 1.0  0.88  0.88  0.70  0.70  0.7
Counterfactual  Tax Revenue
Counterfactual 1989 revenue  of which:  - 11.7  10.8  14.9  14.8  15.9  -
Wage tax or PIT  - 3.3  3.3  3.2  3.3  3.9  -
ZUS rate  - 8.4  7.0  10.0  9.0  9.0  8.8
ZUS  - 8.4  7.5  11.7  11.5  12.0  11.8
Profit  Tax  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Actual profit tax  12.9  9.7  14.0  6.5  4.4  4.1  3.2
Correction for profit tax with amortizationh  1.0  1.63  1.63  1.67  1.7  1.7  -
Counterfactual  profit tax  12.9  15.8  22.8  10.9  7.3  6.8  -
Actual  Temporary Taxes ____-  ____
Dywidenda  n.a.  1.7  2.1  1.4  0.6  0.5  0.2
Popiwek  0.7  1.7  1.4  3.3  1.5  0.6  0.2
Note:  The data are not consolidated,  that is, they include social security contributions  with respect to government
employees, and since 1992 include personal income taxes paid by government  employees and pensioners  on their grossed
up earnings.
n.a.: Not applicable; -:  Not available.
a. PIT = Personal Income Tax introduced in 1992, replaces the wage tax.
b. ZUS = Zaklad Ubezpiecien Socialnych,  own revenue from contributions.
c. FP = Fundusz Pracy, own revenue from contributions.
d. Rocznik 1994, p. 120, tab. 12. and 1995, p. 122, tab. 9 [see also number of contributors to ZUS, rocznik
1995, p. LVI, line 31, table 8 and 9.
e. For the wage tax, government  employees  are subtracted (they were exempt).
f.  1993: /non-gov. empl. 10/[iabor  force 17.7 + pensioners 8.71 =1/2.64
g. Table 2.
h. Table 2 and Schaffer's 4 percent effect of amortization  on profits;
1988  for comparability  without  inflation bias.
means that the higher tax rate and average wage base do not compensate  for the employment  loss.
The opposite  is true if the counterfactual  is lower than the actual revenue. Thus in 1990 there was a
gain, and in 1991 there was a loss.
11In 1992  and 1993  the actual  payroll tax revenue (total or ZUS social contributions)  was
higher than the counterfactual  (total or ZUS contributions):  the gain from higher tax rates again
dominated  the reduction  of the tax base because of employment  loss, more so in 1992 than in 1993.
Wage claims were also more moderate  in these two years than in 1991.5
The contributions  to the social security administration,  ZUS which administers  the Fundusz
Ubezpiecien  Socialnych  (FUS), illustrate  best the response of the tax revenue to wage and tax-rate
changes. Tax rates changed  in 1990 and in 1992. The revenue gain from each change was larger in
the year of change  than in subsequent  years.  Nevertheless,  the contribution  rate increase of 1992 was
not entirely undone by the fall in employment  in subsequent  years.  The wage level played a role.  In
1991  wages rose too fast, while they rose only moderatly  after 1992. As long as the workers were
willing to abandon  net wage growth for social contributions, a small revenue gain seemed possible.
Figure 3 gives a decomposition  of the contributions to ZUS. It shows actual revenue,
counterfactual  revenue and constant  tax rate revenue. Comparing  the evolution of the counterfactual
with the 1989  level gives the wage effect at constant employment  and tax rates: negative in 1990,
positive thereafter. The difference  between line 4 (CFUS) and 3 (TFUS) of the counterfactual  is lost
employment. The difference  between actual revenue and the counterfactual  can be called the
"residual" tax rate effect: it is insufficient  to compensate  for employment  loss in 1991, but is positive
afterward. The difference  between actual revenue in 1989 and the constant tax rate counterfactural
can be called the "residual"  wage effect, that is, it accounts  for the fall in employment  and ignores the
5  The product  of the constant  employment  coefficient  by the constant  tax rate coefficient  gives  the "apparent"
elasticity  of employment  to the  payroll  tax (base 1989).  It is 0.93 in 1990  1.02  in 1991,  0.97 in 1992  and 0.98
in 1993. The elasticity  is higher  than 1 only in 1991,  the year in which  wages  rose most. But, wages  and
employment  moved  simultaneously  for reasons  other  than changes  in the tax wedge. The true tax elasticity
could  thus  be obtained  only from  multivariate  regression  estimates.
12higher tax rates. It is indeed deeply negative in 1990, positive thereafter, and highest in 1991 (tax
6 rates and employment  play a larger role after 1992).
Since 1992  the personal income tax has added a lot of tax revenue.  A large part of it (more
than 2 percent of GDP) is not a net gain.  It comes from personal income taxes on pensions and
government  wages, which have been grossed up for this purpose. 7
Summing  up, it appears that by 1993  the overall revenue from payroll, profit, and related
taxes had recovered to its pre-1989 level of about 25 percent of GDP.  But the composition  of this
revenue changed  drastically. Without the huge increases in social security contribution  rates and
8 personal income tax base,  revenue would  have fallen to below 20 percent of GDP, even if
employment  had remained  constant. The new composition  of this revenue is in line with what is
observed in most OECD economies,  and the shift to lower profit tax rates and higher payroll tax rates
was fully justified in a context of liberalization  where the distribution of income would
inevitably  have shifted  from profits to wages. The problems are that the new payroll tax rates create
a large wedge between net and gross labor income, and that these taxes are still insufficient  to cover
the govermnent's wage and social benefit expenditures.
6  In 1990  both wages and employment  fell.  The fall in employment  cannot  be ascribed  entirely  to the
insufficient  adjustment  of wages  to a new  sustainable  path. Part of it was rematching  (supply  side adjustment),
part cyclical  (lower  demand),  part structural  (finding  a new  equilibrium  unemployment  rate above  the planned
economy  level  of zero).
7 Table 3 gives  total personal  income  tax revenue. Table 10 (below, section  6) gives personal  income  tax
revenue  net of withholdings  on pensions  (table  4) and  on government  wages  (table  6).
8 Note  that a large  part of personal  income  tax revenue  vanishes  in the consolidated  accounts,  as it comes  from
taxes  on pensions  and government  wages  (see  table  3, the difference  between  actual  and counterfactual  PIT).
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A key to the 1991-92  budget deficits and subsequent  increases  in the tax wedge can be sought
in pension expenditures  (this section), possibly adding other income-related  expenditures (section  4).
Because  of the entitlement  nature of the social security system, it cannot be disconnected  from the
evolution of wages. There can also be, and there were, spending  pressures coming from autonomous
changes  in pension claims of the population.
The first link between  pensions and wages is through labor shedding. Higher wages imply
less employment  for a given labor demand. First, enterprises  and workers try to avoid putting too
many people on the dole, instead exploiting  first the pension system. Second, people who enter the
pension system with a higher reference wage earn higher pensions. Third, pensions and government
wages are, by Polish law, indexed to the wages in enterprises. Fourth, high wages attract new
entrants into the labor force, most of whom first spend some time as registered benefit-earning
unemployed.
Table 4 shows counterfactual  pension spending data to quantify  the effects of the main
determinants  of pension spending. Line 1 of the counterfactual  ZUS expenditure  eliminates  the effect
of the personal income tax on pensions from 1992 onward. The two main causes of the rising net
pension expenditure  are the number of pensioners (line 2) and average pensions (lines 3, 4 and 5).
3.1. The pensions of 1989 pensioners
The counterfactuals  can be read horizontally or vertically. Horizontal comparisons  are made
according to the 1989  benchmark. Vertical  comparisons  show the effect of the various correction
coefficients  in a given year.  It is useful to start from net pension spending (line 1). Line 2 then gives
15Table 4:  Pension Expenditure  and its Components
1988  1989  1990 1  1991 1 1992  1 1993  1 1994
Actual ZUS Expenditure  percentage of GDP
Social  insurance  fund ZUSa  8.4{  9.7  8.5  14.0  16.3  15.8  16.1
Corecction coefficients  ratio to 1989
ZUS beneficiariesb  0.98  1.00  1.02  1.12  1.19  1.23  1.25
Real net earningsc  0.99  1.00  0.85  0.97  0.91  0.90  0.93
Personal income taxd  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.17  1.19  1.20
Counterfactual  ZUS expenditure  percentage of GDP
1  Net pension spending  (a/d)  - 9.7  8.5  14.0  13.9  13.3  13.4
2  Net pension spending  implicitly
coming  to the 1989  pensioners  9
[(a/(b*d)]  _  9.7  8.3  12.5  11.6  10.8  10.7
3  Giving the 1989  pensioners  their
real net pension of 1989 withy  9
GDP  9.7  9.8  12.9  12.7  12.0  11.5
[a/(b*d*c)]
4  Giving all pensioners  their real net  _  9.7  10.0  14.4  15.3  14.8  14.4
pension of 1989 with y GDP  9
[a/(c*d)]
5 -Giving  per pensioner  the same net  I
share of each 1989 GDP as in 1989  _  9.7  9.9  10.9  11.5  11.9  12.1
[ZUS 1989*b]
RELATIVE  INCOME GAIN of all
the pensioners  compared  with 1989 (1-5)  - 0.0  -1.4  3.1  2.4  1.4  1.3
Note:1989 is the peak year for real pensions and real wages.
- not  available
a: Rocznik, various issues, and appendix  tables.
b: Rocznik 1992,  p.203, 1994, p.226, 1995, p.156.
c: Rocznik 1994,  p.228, tab. 5, 1995,  p.158, use a group-specific  price
index, own cumulation.
d: Rocznik 1994, p.226, 1995,  p.156, gross to net average monthly pension.
net pension spending in a given year on the number of pensioners in 1989. This figure can be
compared with net pension spending  in 1989. The comparison  shows how pensions  were affected  by
he general income decline. In 1990  pension spending fell to 8.3 percent of GDP (close to the 1988
16level), down from 9.7 percent of GDP in 1989. In 1990, then, 1.4 percent of GDP was saved on
pensions in addition  to the fall in GDP.  In 1991 GDP continued to decline, but 1989  retirees still
managed to obtain 12.5 percent of 1991  GDP, a jump of 2.8 points compared  with 1989  and 4.2
points compared with 1990.
Line 3 shows that giving the 1989 retirees the same real (that is consumer-price-deflated)
pension that they earned in 1989  would have required 12.9 percent of GDP in 1991 (line 3).  This
amount is 0.4 percentage  points more than the 12.5 that they actually  received (line 2).  Pensioners
thus participated  little in the 1991  general income decline. They participated  less than
proportionately,  since the share of GDP going to 1989  pensioners rose.
Another way to look at pensioners' relative income gains and losses is to compare real
pensions and real wages. This is done in table 5, but without  distinguishing  the 1989  pensioners
Table 5: Net Real Wages and Pensions
19881  1989  1 9901  1991  1  1992  1  1993  1  1994
Percentage of 1989,  group specific consumption  index
a. ZUS real pensions  99.0  100 I  84.9  |  97.2  90.9  |  90.3  92.9
b. Average monthly wage  91.7  100  75.6  75.4  73.4  71.2  71.6
Percentage of monthly wage
c. Relative  monthly pension  51.2  50.6  56.8  65.3  62.7  62.1  64.0
d. Relative monthly  retirement  57.3  53.2  65.0  j  76.2  72.5  72.8  73.9
Percentage of worker's household  per capita spending
e. Pensioners relative spending  100  89  99  |  105 |  103 |  113  113
Gini coefficient
f. Pension inequality  0.16  0.19  0.21  |  0.25  0.26  |  0.21  |
--  not available
a: Rocznik 1994, p.228, tab.5. own cumulation,  does not include farmers.
b: Rocznik 1994,  p.212, tab.4, own cumulation.
c: 1990-93:Rocznik  1994,  p.226, tab.3., 1989 own extrapolation.
1992-93:  gross to gross instead of net to net.
d: Rocznik 1991, p.238; 1994, p.227 and lxviii.
e: GUS Bulletin, table I, various issues (new definition  of pensioners  since 1993).
f: computed  on an "Excel" spreadsheet  from brackets given in Rocznik (for example 1994, p.230. tab.8), using the
middle of the bracket as the average income in this bracket.
from later entrants. In 1990 and 1991 pensions  grew relative to wages and in 1992  the reverse
happened (line c, table 5).  In 1993  both followed a smilar path.  In 1994 the pension base went up
17from 91 to 93 percent of the average wage.  During the whole period, and again in October 1995,
new annual rules were set for the timing and the amount of the indexation  of pensions, making it
possible to deviate  from the reference formula (pension base =  100 percent of average wage).  Since
1993 pensions  have stabilized  at about 90 percent of their 1989 level and at about 62 percent of the
average wage.  Since 1991, however, per capita consumption  in a pensioner's household  has been
nevertheless  higher than that in a worker's household. The relative income gain of pensioners is
probably a result of their relatively low starting point, at least for some pensions.
3.2. New entrants and their pensions
Line 4 of table 4 shows that had all pensioners in 1991 been given their real 1989  income the
bill would  have risen to 14.4 percent of GDP. The actual expenditure  was 14 percent of GDP (line
a).  The 0.4 percentage  point saved were actually  saved on the people who had retired by 1989 (lines
2 and 3, as explained  in the previous paragraph). Thus the new pensioners entered receiving  more
favorable  pensions than did the existing sample. The method of table 4 underestimates  the benefits of
the new entrants and underestimates  the loss of past retirees. It uses the average real pension, which
is computed  on the current sample  of pensioners  and thus includes the new entrants  each year.
The effect of the new entrants on pensions also appears in the rising inequality  in the
distribution of pension income, as shown by the Gini coefficient in table 5.  The effect of new
entrants on average pensions  and on spreads  between pensions  was first noted by Maret and Schwartz
(1993). The appendix reports how pensions  have been computed, before and after the law of 17
October 1991. Table 5 shows replacement  rates of more than 60 percent for all pensions  and more
than 70 percent for retirement  pensions.
Line 5 in table 4 shows the effect of the rising number of pensioners on pension spending,
assuming that the share of GDP given to each pensioner remains at its 1989 level.
183.3. Adding the three effects
Figure 4 presents a synthesis  of the three pension expenditure  effects analyzed  in table 4: the
number of retirees, the benefits of pre-1989 retirees, and the benefits of post-1989 retirees. The
figure gives a clear decomposition  of pension expenditure:  the difference  between net pension
spending (NPS) and the generosity  effect (GNEW) is the "number effect", the difference  between
GNEW and the share of GDP spent on 1989  pensions (NPS89) is the "generosity  effect" toward the
post-1989  pensioners, and the difference  between NPS89 and the 1989 benchmark is the "generosity
effect" toward the 1989 pensioners. In terms of their share of GDP, pensioners  lost in 1990, and
gained in all subsequent  years compared to 1989. Most of the gain was obtained in 1991-the
difference  between NPS and the 1989 benchmark remains positive, but declines after 1991.
Aside from 1991, another key year in table 4 seems to be 1993. GDP increased, and real
average pensions stabilized,  while entries slowed. The situation thus started to improve. The
contribution  of the real income  of the 1989 group stabilized  to 1.2 percent of GDP (12 percent -10.8
percent, rows 3-2 for 1993), and that of the post-1989 group stabilized  to 0.3 percent (14.8 percent -
13.3 percent -1.2 percent, rows 4-1-(3-2)  for 1993).9 One should realize how small this decline  is
compared  with the unsustainable  crisis situation  of 1989.
To conclude on pension expenditure, let us return to its relation with wages. There is
evidence  on three counts (labor shedding, reference wages, and indexation)  that wage increases
9The  1.2 percentage  points must be divided  by 6.8 million  pensioners (table 9) to give an individual
contribution  of 0.18 point  per million.  The 0.3 percentage  points  of the additional  two million  pensioners  is
worth  0.15 point  per million.
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Lin--  NPS: net actual pensions  Series2 -o-- NPS89: share of 1989 pensioners  - GNEW: generosity effect]contributed  to pension increases. In addition, pensioners faced a milder adjustment  than workers in
1990 and 1991, and this also helped drive up pension expenditures.
4. OTHER INCOME-RELATED  EXPENDITURES
4.1. Wages in government
Government  employment  was basically  stable over 1988-94. Government  wages, however,
were subject to fluctuations  similar to those of pensions. As for pensions, there were two issues.
The first one was the relation  to be established  between average wages in government and average
wages elsewhere in the economy. The idea in 1988 and 1989, confirmed at the Round Table, was to
raise government  wages over a few years from their actual level in 1988 -less  than 73 percent of
industry wages-to  more than 100  percent of industry wages. The second issue was the indexation  of
government  wages to changes  in industry wages, regardless of their relative level.  These two issues
resurface each year on the budgetary  agenda.
In addition to aggregate  targets, the issue of relative wages within the government  sector
becomes more and more important  as relative wages within the private sector become more
differentiated  according  to education  and responsibilities. The opportunity  cost of labor should
slowly become the key determinant  of government  wages (in a broad sense, including  job security,
fringe benefits, and so on).  Since 1994 the government  has attempted  to move from a scale system to
a bargaining system. This is in line with the attempt to have enterprise wages set by tri-partite
bargaining (employers, unions and government  as well).
Table 6 reveals two major jumps in net government  wages: one in 1989  and one in 1991.
Both correspond  to attempts  to bring government  wages closer to enterprise wages. In 1989 the
catch-up is independent  of the wage behavior in enterprises. It is mainly due to an attempt to make
up for the lack of indexation  in the 1980s. In 1991  the jump can be traced partly to rising enterprise
21wages (chasing  a moving target) and partly to the better protection of civil servants' real wages
compared with that of other groups since the start of the 1990 stabilization.
Table 6: Actual Government Wage Expenditures and its Components
(percentage  of GDP)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Net Government  wages  3.0  4.3  4.1  6.0  5.3  5.3  5.2
Gross Government  wages  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.7  6.7  6.7
Government wage cost  4.0  6.0  5.7  8.0  9.1  9.1  9.0
Wedge between wage costs and net wages  1.0  1.7  1.6  2.0  3.8  3.8  3.8
n.a.  not applicable
All wage data include central and local govermment  expenditures.  Wage cost includes contributions  to ZUS.
In 1992  net government  wages stabilized  at around 91 percent of enterprise wages, and rose
slightly in 1994. The stabilization  of government  employees' (net of tax) share of GDP after 1992
still implies a slight improvement  of their purchasing  power since GDP started to grow again in 1992.
There is no clear evidence  that there are too many government employees  or that they are
overpaid. Government  employment  was apparently  (and fortunately)  not used as an unemployment-
fighting (or hiding) device. Education, however, may have suffered from too many teachers per
pupil: about 1 million teachers for about 11 million people under age 18 (not all of them enrolled in
school).
For the purpose of this paper the main focus here is the government  wage explosion  in 1991,
linked to the general wage explosion  in the economy. In addition, it should be noted that-  like
pensioners-civil servants managed to protect or even raise their wages better than many other groups
(admittedly, though, from a low level).
224.2. Unemployment  costs
Unemployment  expenditures  are directly related to the high-wage  hypothesis  of this paper. It
is paid by the Unemployment  Fund, Fundusz Pracy (FP), which also collects  the contributions. It
totaled around 2 percent of GDP in 1991-94. Registered  unemployment  rose from zero to 2.8 million
between 1989 and 1993. The labor force remained  roughly constant throughout 1989-1994,  while the
number of pensioners rose by 2 million (see table 9 in section 8); thus new entries exactly matched
retirement. Self-employment  rose by 0.5 million, compensating  for part of the 3.3 million
employment  decline. People between 15 and 24 1ears old represent more than 40 percent of the
unemployed  and the unemployment  rate of the age group 18-24 was 32 percent in 1994, compared
with 14 percent for the whole active  population (GUS, Aktwynosc  zawodowa  i bezrobocie  w Polsce,
March 1995).
Given that many of the workers affected  by economic  restructuring were absorbed  by the
pension system, and given the large share of young unemployed, also in the low-unemployment
vojvodships  (see GUS: Bezrobocie  rejestrowane  w Polsce, quarterly), a lot of good evidence  would
have to be provided to reject the hypothesis  that insider wage-setting  cost at least half of
Table 7: Other Social Expenditure
1989  1990  1991  1992  1  1993  1994
percentage of GDP
Social insurance-farmers  1.0  1.3  1.9  2.1  2.1  2.4
Unemployment  fund  0.1  0.6  1.6  2.2  2.0  2.1
percent of ZUS expenditure
Family allowances in ZUS  16.7  16.0  14.6  15.3  15.4  15.8
Source: Budgetary  data and GUS Rocznik 1994, p. 227,  1991,  p. 239.
23unemployment  expenditures,  that is, 1 percent of GDP.  The rest may be ascribed to the inevitable
restructuring of economic  activity and normal market frictions.
In addition to the budgetary  cost of unemployment  benefits, the lost (registered) employment
represented a net loss of revenue.  The lost social security contributions  and personal income taxes
were shown in table 3.  Table 3 does not distinguish  between labor shed through retirement and
unemployment. Moreover, it does not include outsiders who were kept out of employment.  The
lost taxes on and contributions  from the unemployed are of the order of 1 or 2 percent of GDP (10
percent of the population  is not contributing  to sources of income  worth roughly 20 percent of GDP).
4.3. Peasant pensions
Peasant pensions  went up from 1 to 2.4 percent of GDP between 1989 and 1994. They are
paid by the social insurance  fund of farmers-Fundusz  Ubezpiecien  Socialnych  Rolnikow (FUSR).10
These pensions are not high, the peasants are often old and were the social group hardest hit by the
price liberalization, after an initial gain in 1989.  Retired peasants  usually keep other sources of
income, and their pensions  actually offer a gocd return on contributions  that were very small. This
source of expenditures  can hardly grow, given that the existing  pool of peasants  will only shrink
further. The taxation  and social protection  of ifarmers  can be modernized. The budgetary difficulties
of 1991 and the high burden of total public expenditures  on the economy  cannot be traced back to
fanner's pensions, and only to a very limited extent to credit subsidies  and price supports to
agriculture (another  2 percent of GDP).
This fund  has also  been  called  Fundusz  Ubezpiecien  Emeritalno-rentownych.
244.4. Family allowances
Finally, family allowances  are a small  percentage of GDP and fall mainly outside  the scope of
this study.  The relevant facts are the following. A large part of family allowances  go to old people,
as an additional  form of income support rather than in proportion to the number of children they
raise.  A number of studies of income distribution in Poland and in Central Europe show that
financial  hardship is more frequent among young households  with children than any other population
group (see Grootaert 1995). The share of family allowances  in total social spending  and the ratio of
the average family allowance  to the average pension have declined  slightly. They reached their
lowest level in 1991, when wages and pensions  peaked. This suggests  either a diversion of spending
in favor of more powerful groups or inefficient  rules for allocating social spending.
5. POLICY  EVALUATION  AND IMPLICATIONS
5.1. From profit taxes and subsidies  to payroll taxes and benefits
The above analysis  of government revenue and expenditure  suggests  that a structural shift
occurred in the distribution  of tax revenue-away  from profit taxes and into payroll taxes-and  in the
distribution  of income-away from profits into wages. It may even be tempting to claim that by
taxing these higher wages at a higher rate, it was also possible to shift part of the labor force away
from earning labor income, and toward earning benefits. This change could facilitate  the enterprise
restructuring initiated by the elimination  of most subsidies.
In this context the economic  transformation  can be seen as a change of social contract.  The
old contract was between firms and the government. It basically  implied that profit taxes financed
subsides, which in turn justified that firms were in charge of full employment  and some benefits. The
new contract is between workers and the government. It implies that payroll taxes finance
replacement  income. The government  stops intervening  in most production  decisions, and it stops
25giving firms monopoly  positions. But it guarantees  the replacement  income of workers with the
general budget if contributions  are not sufficient. This explanation  of the fall in enterprise  profits and
in profit tax revenue is not limited to a substitution  of wages for profits.  It includes a reorganization
of the economy, in which subsidies  vanish, competition increases, and distortions on production  are
significantly  reduced. Also, labor market distortions  may rise but in a nonarbitrary way.
In practice, the budgetary  adjustment  was not easy.  The old contract was already in deficit,
despite its discretionary  nature (subsidies  could be changed product by product) and hence its
potential flexibility. The new contract  is not discretionary. It is composed  of entitlements  and hence
is harder to keep within the bounds  of available  means.
The reduction of enterprise subsidies  went further than that of profit taxes, and there was a
small net gain (1 percent of GDP) for the budget in net transfers from enterprises. The explanation  of
Barbone  and Marchetti (1995) is that price liberalization  reduced the terms of trade of the profitable
(tax-paying)  sectors and improved  the terms of trade of the unprofitable  (formerly subsidized)  sectors.
In practice, a large number of firms reported losses, gambling to various extents with the long-term
budget  constraint.
A further implication  of the change in income allocation is that part of the savings that used to
be retained  by the firms will now be allocated  by the workers.  In addition to housing, productive
investment  will compete  for these savings. Pension funds could be a useful intermediary  for
efficiently allocating  these savings.
Since 1994  profits have recovered. That year the government  assigned industrial policy
objectives  to the profit tax (through deductions  and exemptions), often at the expense of the revenue-
raising objective.
265.2. The importance  of pensions during the transition
High pension expenditures  could be justified by the need for restructuring and for eliminating
the excess employment  forced by the old regime.  This would explain part of the high number of
retirees. The easy eligibility  to early retirement should be a transitory feature of pension regulation,
not a permanent one.
Tables 4 and 5 show that the better deal received by pensioners-not just their numbers-also
fueled the cost of pensions. An argument in favor of the pattern followed  by Polish pensions is that
relatively stable pensions played a positive role as automatic  aggregate  demand stabilizers  (and,
indeed, by 1992  per capita spending in pensioners' household became  higher than in workers'
households,  table 5).
In addition, high pensions  may also have contributed  to the social acceptability  of reforns.  If
reforms were successful,  workers could expect higher future labor incomes. Moreover, because old
people had no opportunity  to accumulate  savings in the past, better treatment of the prereform retiree
were justified on equity grounds. Such treatment should be phased out quickly. The working-age
population should adjust  to a new pension system, which must be clearly preannounced.
Unfortunately,  no new pension system has been so announced. Meanwhile, tables 4 and 5 and figure
4 suggest  that new pensions  are on average more generous than old ones, a feature that will be hard
to sustain on equity grounds  and with pay-as-you go financing.
5.3. The benefits
The issue of benefits concerns  their level, variance, and rate of change.  In Poland all
pensions  used to be computed on a single  base with various adjustments  for the years of service, past
earnings, or occupations. The aim set at the 1989 Round Table was to equate the base with the
27average wage, and index it monthly to this wage.  The law of 17 October 1991 modified the formulas
in use and abolished  bonuses above a certain level.  A summary  is given in appendix 1.
The debate over wage versus price indexation  is a difficult one."  The indexation  of pensions
to prices instead  of wages is usually recommended  in a growing economy: it gives the budget some
breathing space when productivity  gains increase wages faster than prices.  The position of pensioners
then deteriorates  relative to workers, but not relative to past and extrapolated  (expected)  earnings.
Further pension increases  can then be decided if the equity gain seems to exceed the efficiency cost of
the transfer. In a transition or adjustment  period, however, real wages fall from unsustainable
heights. It can be argued that pensions should also contribute  some real adjustment,  depending their
initial level.  It appears from table 5 that wage indexation  may have been less costly in 1990 and 1991
than price indexation,  or even than the adjustments  that were actually  made.
In transition  an important  issue concerning  benefits is that of default on unwarranted social
obligations. Default in 1991-on  all pensions by budgetary  emergency  in the summer, and on high
pensions  by law in October-was  not acceptable  to the Constitutional  Court.  The compensation  for
this default will take the form of privatization  vouchers, but this solution  has not yet been worked
out.  The uncertainty  created by the outright default in 1991  may, however, have had more damaging
political effects than the income loss of some pensioners.
Outright default could have been avoided by using a less optimistic  definition  of the pension
base and longer indexation  intervals, while still raising real pensions compared with 1990. This way
of softening  pension expenditures  was used in each budget since 1992. Unfortunately,  the 1991
budget  was prepared in the context of a presidential election, rising wages, and a misguided
impression  that the 1990 stabilization  had gone too far in reducing consumption  and creating  a budget
"I n Poland  wage  indexation  of pensions  can  mean  two different  things.  One  is to let pensions  (whatever  their
level)  grow  at the same  rate as wages  grow. The second  is to equalize  the base  used in the pension  formula  to
the average  wage.  This  base is currently  93 percent  of the average  wage.
28surplus. As a longer-term  alternative  to an annual definition  of pension benefits, funding could have
been phased in faster, even for past obligations (Topinski  and Wisniewski 1991). The transformation
of the entitlements  of the old system into shares in new capitalized  pension funds can be made on a
voluntary  basis or provided  the risk and return modifications  are perceived as socially fair.  Future
obligations  can be built on new bases-the  sooner the better.
An additional  issue is the taxation of pension benefits. As noted in de Crombrugghe  (1994a),
taxation makes it possible to reduce the net cost of rising benefits. It can also reduce after-tax
pension inequality. It introduces  some "active"  targeting (favoring  those in need) in a system that
mainly works with "passive"  targeting (ensuring noone is left out).  Moreover, it seems that a large
number of people can continue to work while earning a pension (see section 5.4).  Including  pensions
in taxable income is in accordance  with the ability to pay principle. Poland included  pensions in
taxable  personal income in 1992.
5.4. Retirement  eligibility
Thanks to the current economic  recovery following the massive  early retirement in 1991 and
1992, retirement has slowed since 1993 (table 8), as has pension spending (see table 4).  This recent
trend could create a dangerous  illusion of sustainability  of the current system, as it did after the 1980-
82 crisis (table 9).
29The evolution of the retirement and employment  numbers in the 1989-94  (table 8) is this far
not so different than those of 1980-85  (table 9).  Fortunately, we can hope that the current recovery
in GDP will be stronger and last longer than the one that followed  the deep depression  of 1980-82.
Table 8: Population
(31 December,  millions)
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
l.a.  Labor force  17.4  17.3  17.6  17.5  17.6  17.7
I.b.  Employed  and others  12.6  11.2  10.2  9.6  9.3  -
I.c. Self-employed  5.0  5.3  5.7  5.9  - -
ld.  Unemployed  0.0  1.1  2.2  2.5  2.9  2.8
2.a. Pension earners  6.8  7.1  7.9  8.5  8.7  8.9
2.b. of which: invalids  (2.2)  (2.2)  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6
2.c.  farmers  (1.4)  (1.5)  1.8  2.0  2.0  2.0
3.  Contributors  to ZUS  1  +.7  14.1  13.6  13.3  12.7  12.6
4.  Farmers (self-empl.)  4.0  - - - 3.4  -
5.  Benef.-earn. unempl.  0.0  0.9  1.7  1.3  l  -
Total population  38.0  38.2  38.3  38.4  38.5  38.6
Young <  18  11.4  11.3  11.3  11.2  11.0  10.9
Working  age  22.8  23.0  23.0  23.2  23.4  23.5
Working  age  3.8  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.1  4.2
Old >  65  1 
not available
*  annual average (not 31 December)
**  aged between 18 and 64, there is another definition  next page of Rocznik
Note:  New definition  of all labor force data: Individual  farmers were overestimated  by GUS from 1989  to 1993 (GUS
Bulletin 1994,  7, p. 11 et 40, GUS Rocznik 1994,  p.1 15, note 3). GUS data on subgroups of the labor force add up to
less than the total: the residual is in lb (employed  and others).
Sources: GUS Rocznik 1992, p.42, 203 et 1993, p. 47,  109, 111, 122,  215.
1994, p.49, 117, 227
GUS Bulletin 1994,6: p.37, 40, 49;  1995,2: p.42, 51
The current recovery is expected  to originate in sounder economic  and market bases than the previous
one.  Nevertheless,  at the next downturn it will be harder for the economy to "grow out" of a new
30retirement burden. Indeed, the potential for fast "catch-up" growth may be reduced, the possibility  to
raise contribution  rates will be exhausted, and the relative number of contributors will start to fall as
Polish demography  begins to look like the Western one: fewer births and longer life expectancy.
Moreover, the number of unemployed-still  held to zero in the 1980s-now adds to the number of
retirees as a burden for the budget and a loss of productive capacity.
The distribution  of early retirement by age is difficult  to assess. There is a lack of data
disaggregated  by age. Labor force participation  is of the order of 65 percent for the age group 45-54
and 25 percent for the age group older than 55 (GUS, Rocznik 1994, p.49, table 4 and p.1 13, table
5).  The average retirement age was estimated to be 55 years, while the statutory  rate was 65 for men
and 60 for women. It should be safe to tighten the rules.  Limiting access is more efficient and
possibly more equitable than reducing pensions, especially  the low ones. Cross-country  comparisons
made by Fakin and de Crombrugghe  (1996) suggest that pension expenditure  is affected  by the
generosity  of pensions, but that the number of pensioners is not.  Accessibility  rules are then a more
important  determinant  of the number of people involved  than the attractiveness  of the benefits, which
may then be higher if the number is low.
Information on the number of pensioners (retirees or invalids)  earning labor income in
addition  to their pensions is also very scarce. The number of people involved  may be relatively
large, however. A comparison  of a labor force survey (GUS "Aktywnosc  Zawodowa i Bezrobocie  w
Polsce" 12/1993  p. 142) with data on registered pensioners (GUS Rocznik Statystyczny),  in 1993,
showed 1 million more registered  pension earners (8,730 thousand)  than persons out of the labor
force who had worked previously  (7,729 thousand).
31Table 9: The 1981 Economic and Pension Crisis
1980  1981  1 1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
percentage of net wage
a. Contribution  rate  15.5  25j  33  33  33  33  43  38
________________________________  _______  ______  millions  of persons  |
b. Number of pensioners  4.5  4.8  5.3  5.8  6.1  6.2  6.3  6.5
c. Active  population  17.3  17.4  17.0  17.0  17.0  17.1  17.2  17.1
d. ZUS contributors  14.0  14.1  13.7  13.7  13.9  14.0  14.3  14.5
previous year = 100
e. Real prod. income  94.0  88.0  94.5  106.0 j  105.6  103.4  [104.9  102.0
Source: a. Wiktorow  (1994),. p.5, the 38 percent rate applied in 1987-89.
b. GUS Rocznik 1991, p. XXVI, line 6.
c,d,e. GUS Rocznik 1991,  p. XXIV, lines 15, 25, and 27.
5.5.  Financing  and cost
There are three ways to finance pensions: through taxes, debt,  or savings.  The first two have
been used,  and the third one has often been mentioned.
There are interesting theoretical arguments in favor of debt and taxes (pay-as-you-go) in fast
growing economies.  Uncertainties about the long-run sustainability of the promised benefits,  future
productivity and population growth,  the rate of return on capital, and the current opportunity cost of
funds call for caution.  In addition,  taxes cause distortions that have to be weighed against the benefits
of raising revenue.
A funded pillar in the pension system is always a useful complement-especially  so in
transition countries for two reasons.  First,  it should be relatively easy to start in transition countries.
32State  assets could be used to create the initial capital.  It can even be argued that part of current
pensions (especially  the bonuses)  could be serviced from such funds, since the underlying assets were
accumulated  "in the name of the people."  Second, the reallocation  of savings to new productive
investment  is essential  for the long-run growth of these economies. Pension funds can play an
important  role in financial intermediation.
Financing future rights to pensions in a credible and sustainable  way is the key to successful
pension reform.  It can even be argued  that current obligations  can be partly debt-financed  if future
obligations are perceived  to be safely funded and to generate enough surplus  to service any
transitional  debt.  The only remaining  issue with such a strategy is whether it is equitable  to shift the
burden of current obligations  onto future generations. But it is most probably doable. Failing to
reform future pension rights, Poland has been obliged to modify current ones to solve budgetary
problems and has created  uncertainty  and discontent among retirees and the active  population.
5.6. The role of wages
The key issue is still wages. The wage explosion of late 1990  and 1991  proved very costly in
employment  terms and brought almost  no purchasing  power to the workers: taxes and price
adjustments  ate it all up.
An economic  restructuring  argument for high wages and easy pensions could work if the
economy as a whole were limited to a deal between workers and pensioners. But in addition to these
"insiders," there are a number of "outsiders.  "  High wages and high benefits  have kept the outsiders
from employment  at an additional  cost.  The unemployed are mainly young.  They could be
productive and become tax payers.  Unemployment  benefits and farmer pensions  in 1993, compared
with the pre-1989 situation, claimed an additional  3 percent of GDP.
33The 1991 pension spending and government wage crisis is due to an attempt to chase a
moving target: rising average wages raised benefits and the number of beneficiaries. The ensuing
default had high political costs.  High wages created less revenue than they destroyed  social security
contributions  by destroying  employment. In subsequent  years revenue from contributions  rose
because  of higher contribution  rates, slower wage growth, and slower employment  destruction. Yet
inflation  remained stubbornly  above 20 percent, the tax wedge rose, and uncertainties about taxation,
inflation, and government  policies in general pushed various groups to claim preemptive  income
gains, which indirectly  refueled inflation. Keeping  wages lower could have reduced the
unemployment  and pension costs of the transition. The productivity  gains recorded by paying people
better and by retiring the least productive workers do not justify the wages reached. The private
sector grew quickly, while keeping its average wages lower than those in the state sector. The Czech
Republic, for example, waited much longer into the transition process before letting wages grow.
6. INCOME CLAIMS  AND STRUCTURAL  DEFICITS
The paper has studied  the budgetary revenue and expenditure  effect of the income claims of
various groups: firms (profits and subsidies), workers (wages and payroll taxes), pensioners, and
other social-benefit  earners. The effect of their claims are summarized  in table 10, which should be
compared with Appendix  2. The last two rows of the table are the most interesting  for our
conclusions. Row r shows the evolution of the structural  deficit due to income claims.  This deficit
does not improve  until 1993. The gain comes from the near-complete  elimination  of subsidies (line
b), which dominates  the loss in profit taxes (line c).  Pensions minus contributions (line k) and other
net personal income expenditures  and revenue (line q) are still in deficit in 1993. Improvements  come
from the personal income tax (line p) and income claims in GDP (line h) that were lower in 1992 and
1993  compred withl991 (GDP recovery), but still higher than before reform.
34The total burden (line s) of this major part of the total budget has fallen by only 2.5 percent of
GDP between the prereform  period and 1993.  It took a reduction of subsidies by  12.3 percent of
GDP (line b, last column) to achieve this reduction of fiscal distortions.  The gain
Table  10: Summary of Budgetary  Changes  due to Income Claims
1987-89  1991  diff, of  1992  diff. of  1993  diff. of
- - . 1987-89  1987-89  1987-89
l______  Jand 1992  and 1993
percentage of GDP
a. Profit tax  12  6.5  -5.5  4.4  -7.6  4.0  -8.0
b. Subsidies (all)  (15)  (3.8)  (-11.3)  (3.4)  (-11.6)  (2.7)  (12.3)
c. Net (a-b)  3  +2.8  +5.8  + 1.0  +4.0  +1.3  +4.3
d. FUS contribution  8.5  11.4  +2.9  12.9  +4.4  12.9  +4.4
e. Contribution  rate  +1.3  +3.9  +3.9
f. Employment  -1.7  -2.4  -3.0
g. Wage (d-e-f)  +3.3  +2.9  +3.5
h. Net FUS pensions  (8.5)  (14.0)  (+5.5)  (13.9)  (+5.4)  (13.3)  (+4.8)
i. Entitlements  +1.5  +2.2  +2.5
j. Benefit (h-i)  +4.0  1  +3.2  +2.3
k. Net (d-h)  0.0  -2.6  -2.6  -1.0  -1.0  -0.4  -0.4
1.  FUSRpensions  (0-9)  (1.9)  (+1.0)  (2.1)  (+1.2)  (2.1)  (+1.2)
m. Unemployment  benefits  (0.0)  (1.6)  (+1.6)  (2.2)  (+2.2)  (2.0)  (+2.0)
n. Unemployment  contributions  0.0  0.6  +0.6  0.6  +0.6  0.8  +0.8
o. Net government  wages  (3.5)  (6.0)  (+2.5)  (5.3)  (+1.8)  (5.3)  (+1.8)
p. PIT (excl. gov.)  3.5  2.6  -0.9  3.3  -0.2  4.0  +0.5
q. Net (p-l-m+n-o)  -0.9  -6.3  -5.4  -5.7  -4.8  -4.6  -3.7
r. Net total (c+k+q)  -3.9  -6.1  -2.2  -5.7  -1.8  -3.7  +0.2
s. Total spending  27.9  27.2  -0.7  26.9  -1.0  25.4  -2.5
Note:  Numbers  in 0 are expenditure, which enter negatively in sums except in total spending.
e=(d*coeffh  table 3)-d
f=(e/coeff e table 3)-e
i =h-(h/coeff b table 4)
p  =personal  income tax excluding  taxes on government  wages and on pensions.
s= sum of all expenditure (or expenditure  changes).  It measures total burden.
Source: Tables in text.
35disappears  if we add the personal income tax on government  wages and on pensions as well as the
social security contributions  on government  wages (6.3 percent of GDP)1 2 in internal government
accounts.
The economic  gain is fortunately  larger than the 2.5 percent at the end of line s.  One can
hope that the current labor market distortions  hurt allocative  efficiency  less than the former product
and capital market distortions. Nevertheless, the employment  cost is large.  This employment  cost is
unfortunate for productive reasons, as well as for equity and political reasons.
Figure 5 summarizes  the message of table 10, showing  the two main causes of the persisting
budget deficit (line r) and the total tax burden.'3  The ratio of the average pension to the average wage
was unsustainably  high in 1991. The ratio of the number of pensioners  per worker contributing  to
ZUS is still rising and may now be the main cause of trouble.  Both effects caused a large deficit in
1991-92  and then drove the tax burden upward.
12 This 6.3 percent  of GDP  is the sum  of the following  items. In table  6, personal  income  tax on government
wages  in 1993:  1.4, social  security  contributions  2.4. In table  4, personal  income  tax on pensions  2.5.
13 The tax  burden  is measured  by the fully  consolidated  government  revenue  (data  in appendix  instead  of table
12). This includes  sources  of income  like indirect  taxes,  which  played  a major  role in the recovery  of revenue
since  1992,  as suggested  in de Crombrugghe  (1994a).
36Figure 5: Structural Burdens
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The hypothesis that the unwarranted  wage recovery of late 1990 and 1991 destabilized  the
budget is supported in this analysis. The main channel has not through the reduction in enterprises
profits and profit taxes (profits may have had to fall anyway), but the explosion  of pension and
unemployment  expenditures. This channel has two parts.  One is the large nurnber of people
involved; the second is the protection  of social income.
Liberalization  of the economy  enabled the insiders in firms to bargain wages above the level
that was warranted by the productivity  of the total labor force in an economy that was hit by a
systemic  transformation  in 1990  and a major trade shock in 1991. The generous  pension system
encouraged  the retirement of enough  people at the state's expense  to raise the wages of those
remaining  in firms, while new entrants to the labor force remained unemployed  longer. The process
was facilitated  by economic  restructuring, the general uncertainty about the worker productivity,
mounting  unemployment,  and the social status and income protection  enjoyed by retirees.  The best-
protected  pensions were those of a few specific groups and those of the most recent entrants, who
indeed benefitted  from the wage increases  of 1990-91. Pension inequality  rose.
The pension problem was tackled, on the one hand, by raising contribution  rates.  Pension
expenditures  then became  less of a cause of budget deficits since 1992, but more of a wedge between
net wages and wage costs. Wage increases  now translate into higher gains in payroll tax revenue than
losses in profit taxes at constant  employment  (table 2).  Employment,  however, was declining  for
most of the period (table 3).  There is nevertheless  a chance that payroll tax increases  produced more
revenue than base destruction  (table 3 and figure 3, except 1991), since wage growth started to slow
slightly in 1992.
The pension problem was tackled, on the second hand, by limiting the indexation  of pensions
each year since 1992, taking into account the available  budgetary means. The share of net pensions
38GDP declined  in 1993, thanks to resumed  GDP growth.  There is no long-term mechanism  that
ensures that this trend will continue, that the share of pensions in GDP will eventually  stabilize, or
that future benefits  will be linked to accumulated  funds.
Caution is still needed with respect to current pensions, and future provision rights should  be
reformed. The next employment  crisis could correspond to a decline  in the contributing  labor force
(the population  underl8 is steadily declining). A renewed  explosion of the cost of pensions through
early retirement and high benefits for some groups could be difficult  to finance.  In the meantime, the
goverrnent could reconsider the burden of pensions on the economy. Indeed, official data claim that
per capita consumption  in a worker's household is less than that in a pensioner's household, the tax
wedge is 44 percent of the average gross wage, and investment  resources are needed for growth.
Poland could look at some interesting  innovations  with pension systems that have been successfully
tested in other countries.
Caution is also still needed with wages. The current economic  recovery should create  jobs,
not raise wages. The 1991 crisis following  the high profits and budget surplus of 1990 is a warning.
A temporary  use of the retirement mechanism  could have been justified by economic  restructuring,
but the permanent  nature of the current system is a continuous  threat to the budget and the labor
market. Private firms now contribute  to keep wages closer to equilibrium and to create employment
opportunities. In the critical early transition years the dividend tax and the tax on excess wages were
useful revenue  raisers and wage moderators. Maintaining  an efficient labor market, hard budget
constraints, and sound  and credible  fiscal and monetary policies are keys to wise income policy.
Employment  and general economic  growth, financial stability, and equitable opportunities  for
all people require a moderation  of the income claims of the best protected  groups.
39APPENDIX 1
Pension rules
1. Indexation and revalorization
A key point to understand the computation of pensions in Poland is the reference to the average
wage in the economy (originally in industry or in enterprises). The objective, at least since 1989, is
to compute pensions as percentages of this average wage.  In practice, because of the high cost of
the pension formulas based on the average wage, this wage has been replaced each year by a
pension basis.  The numerous "revalorizations" of pensions in the past five years were related to
this pension basis.  It had to be indexed to wage changes (equal rate of growth) and also to be
brought closer to the effective average wage (level adjustment). Savings were made by lengthening
the intervals between indexations and by  keeping the basis to 91 percent of the average wage
instead of 100 percent.  In 1994 the relative improvement in public finances prompted a 2 point
gain in the basis: to 93 percent of the average wage.
2. The main formula before the law of 17 October 1991
The law of 17 October 1991 was the main attempt at reforming pensions.  Before the law, the
following formula was mainly in use (Rutkowski 1991):
P=0.55xeW+0.01  x(T-20)xeW
P =  monthly pension,
e =  average monthly earnings from three consecutive years
as a percentage of the average wage in these years,
W= average wage or base for pensions,
T = total years of service
An individual with 40 (30) years of service could thus obtain 75 (65) percent of his previous best
wage.
3. The main formula in the law of October 17, 1991
After the law of October 17, 1991, the main formula in use for pensions became:
P=0.24xW+(0.013  T+0.007N)xeB
P = monthly pension,
e =  average monthly reference earnings
as a percentage of the average wage in these years,
40W= average wage or minimum base for pensions,
B = average wage or individual base for pension or W,
T = total years of contributions,
N = other eligible years.
An  individual with  40 (30) years  of contributions and earning the  average wage for his best
reference years could thus obtain 76 (63) percent of his best previous wage (and of the average
wage).  An individual contributing the same amount of time but earning less than the average wage
would have a replacement ratio above 76 percent, while an individual earning more would have a
replacement ratio below 76 percent.  The system thus became more redistributive.  In addition, the
law limited the individual base (eB) of pensions to 250 percent of the average wage and created a
minimum pension of 35 percent of the average wage.
The law of 17 October 1991 turned out to be a financial time bomb, not a political success. The
better protection of low pensions and the greater attractiveness of pensions for low-wage eamers
could have contributed to (and can still contribute to)  a rising cost per person and to a larger
nurmber  of retirees.  It is unsure, however, that these effects were dominant in explaining pension
spending, especially not the attractiveness effect.
TIhe  lack of political success came from the default on old high pensions that the formula and its
cap included.  A reform that could have redressed the inequities of the old regime was instead
perceived as creating insecurity.  Combined with the financial problems of  1991, it gave the
impression that  pensions would not  be  guaranteed in  the  future.  The law  was  successfully
challenged in the Constitutional Court (April 1992),  which ordered the full payment of the pensions
committed in the past.  The government can, however, decide how it will pay and considers using
privatization vouchers.
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Budget  Tables:  General  Government  and  Extrabudgetary  Funds
1. 1987-1990  General  Budget  in percent  of GDP
1987  1988  1989  1990
Central  Budget  Revenue  34.3  35.6  29.7  32.5
of which:
Turnover,  Tariffs,  VAT  13.0  12.9  8.8  7.1
Profits,  Dividends  12.0  13.4  12.1  17.7
Wage,  Excess  Wage  Taxes  3.9  4.2  5.0  4.4
Personal  Income  Tax  x  x  x  x
Others:Tax,  Non-tax  5.4  5.1  3.8  3.3
Central  Budget  Spending  37.8  37.0  35.7  31.9
of which:
Investment  5.6  5.3  4.1  3.6
Subsidies  15.9  16.0  12.5  7.1
Social  Funds  1.5  1.5  2.3  3.3
Wage  Costs  4.2  4.0  6.0  5.7
Goods,  Sv, others  (resid.)  10.6  10.2  10.8  12.2
Interest
Central  Budget  Balance  -3.5  -1.4  -6.0  0.6
Local Revenue  xx  x  x
Local  Spending
Local  Balance  x  x  x  x
. x  x  x  x
Extrabudgetary  Revenue  18.6  17.9  18.1  18.9
Extrabudgetary  Spending  15.9  16.5  19.3  16.8
Extrabudgetary  Balance  2.7  1.4  -1.2  2.1
General  Government
(fully consolidated)
Revenue  48.0  48.9  41.1  43.8
Expenditure  48.8  49.0  48.3  41.1
Balance  -0.8  -0.1  -7.1  2.7
Memorandum  Items:
GDP  17  30  100  607
CPI  average  ..  160  351  685
CPI  Dec/Dec  ..  174  740  350
422. 1991-1996  General  Budget  in percent  of GDP
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Prelim.  Bud.
Central  Budget  Revenue  25.6  27.2  29.5  30.0  31.3  29.6
of which:
Turnover,  Tariffs,  VAT  9.5  11.3  14.1  13.8  14.6
Profits,  Dividends  7.9  4.9  4.2  3.4
Wage,  Excess  Wage  Taxes  5.9  1.5  0.6  0.2  x  x
Personal  Income  Tax  x  6.3  7.8  8.2  8.5  8.7
Others:Tax,  Non-tax  2.3  3.2  2.6  4.3
Central  Budget  Spending  29.3  33.4  32.2  32.8  34.6  32.4
of which:
Investment  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.4
Subsidies  3.8  3.4  2.7  2.4
Social  Funds  5.2  7.7  7.5  7.5  8.4  6.3
Wage  Costs  7.3  7.9  7.8  6.9  7.5  7.5
Goods,  Sv,  others  (res.)  9.9  9.7  9.0  10.0
Interest  1.2  2.9  3.6  4.4  5.9  5.2
Central  Budget  Balance  -3.8  -6.1  -2.8  -2.6  -3.3  -2.8
Local  Revenue  6.1  5.6  6.2  7.0  6.8  7.7
Local  Spending  5.4  5.6  6.1  7.1  6.8  7.7
Local  Balance  0.6  -0.0  +0.0  -0.0  +0.0  +0.0
Extrabudgetary  Revenue  19.6  23.2  23.1  22.1
Extrabudgetary  Spending  19.3  22.0  21.5  21.4
Extrabudgetary  Balance  0.3  1.2  1.6  0.7
General  Government
(fully consolidated)
Revenue  41.5  39.9  42.8  42.6
Expenditure  44.4  44.9  44.0  44.7
Balance  -2.9  -5.0  -1.2  -2.2
Memorandum  Items:
GDP  824  1149  1558  2104  2633  3446
CPI  average  170  143  135  132  123  120
CPI Dec/Dec  160  144  138  129  117  117
433. Extrabudgetary  Funds  : 1987-1990  Data  in percent  in GDP
EXTRABUDGETARY  FUNDS  1987  1988  1989  1990
AND  UNITS
REVENUE  (funds, gross)  16.9  16.6  16.9  17.9
o.w.  FROM  CENTRAL  BUDGET  3.0  3.2  4.8  5.8
Social  Insurance  Fund  [1]  10.1  9.1  9.7  9.5
o.w.  from  Budget  0.7  0.7  1.3  1.5
Soc.Insurance  Fund  Farmers[2]  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.4
o.w.  from  Budget  0.7  0.7  1.0  1.2
Employment  Fund  [3]  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.8
o.w.  from  Budget  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6
Other  (Itemized  Social)  [4]  x  x  x  x
o.w.  from  Budget  x  x  x  x
Other  (Residual)  5.8  6.5  6.0  6.2
o.w.  from  Budget  1.5  1.7  2.5  2.5
EXPENDITURE  14.2  15.2  18.1  15.8
Social  Insurance  Fund  8.3  8.4  9.7  8.5
Soc.  Insurance  Fund  Farmers  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.3
Employment  Fund  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6
Other  (Itemized  Social)  x  x  x  x
Other  4.9  5.9  7.3  5.5
BALANCE  2.7  1.4  -1.2  2.1
Social  Insurance  Fund  1.9  0.7  -0.1  1.0
Social  Insurance  Farmers  0.0  -0.0  0.1  0.1
Employment  Fund  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2
Other  (Itemized  Social)  x  x  x  x
Other  (Residual)  0.8  0.7  -1.5  0.7
Internal  Consolidation  Item:
Transfers  among  Funds(FUS-FP)  ..
Overall  Consolidation  Item:
Income  Tax  on Social  Security  x  x  x  x
EXTRABUDGETARY BORROWING
Bad  Debt  Restructuring  0.0  0.0  1.4  0.9
EXTRABUDGETARY UNITS
Revenue  1.7  1.3  1.2  1.2
o.w.  from  Budget(Con.It.)  0.7  0.4  0.2  0.2
Expenditure  1.7  1.3  1.1  1.2
Balance  0.0  -0.0  0.1  0.0
444. Extrabudgetary  funds:  1991-1996  Data  in percent  in GDP
EXTRABUDGETARY  FUNDS AND  UNITS  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Prelim.  Budget
REVENUE  (funds, gross)  18.3  22.5  22.2  21.3
o.w.  FROM  CENTRAL  BUDGET  5.4  7.8  7.7  7.6
Social  Insurance  Fund  [1]  14.1  17.2  17.1  16.5  16.7  14.8
o.w.  from  Budget  2.7  4.3  4.2  3.9  5.1  3.4
Soc.Insurance  Fund  Farmers[2]  1.8  2.1  2.2  2.4  2.6  2.3
o.w.  from  Budget  1.7  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.4  2.2
Employment  Fund  [3]  1.5  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.0
o.w.  from  Budget  0.9  1.4  1.3  1.4  1.6  1.2
Other  (Itemized  Social)  [4]  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
o.w.  from  Budget  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2
Other  (Residual)  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.0
o.w.  from  Budget  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
EXPENDITURE  18.1  21.3  20.6  20.7
Social  Insurance  Fund  14.0  16.3  15.8  16.1  16.6  14.9
Soc.  Insurance  Fund  Farmers  1.9  2.1  2.1  2.4  2.6  2.3
Employment  Fund  1.6  2.2  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.0
Other  (Itemized  Social)  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2
Other  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.0
BALANCE  0.3  1.2  1.7  0.6
Social  Insurance  Fund  0.2  0.9  1.3  0.4  0.1  -0.0
Social  Insurance  Farmers  -0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.0
Employment  Fund  -0.2  -0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
Other  (Itemized  Social)  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.0  -0.0
Other  (Residual)  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.0  -0.0  -0.0
Internal  Consolidation  Item:
Transfers  among  Funds(FUS-FP)  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6
Overall  Consolidation  Item:
Income  Tax  on  Social  Security  x  2.4  2.5  2.7
EXTRABUDGETARY BORROWING
Bad  Debt  Restructuring  0.0  0.0  1.4  0.9
EXTRABUDGETARY UNITS
Revenue  1.7  1.3  1.5  1.4  1.2  1.2
o.w.  from  Budget(Con.It.)  0.7  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
Expenditure  1.7  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.1  1.1
Balance  0.0  -0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1
45Notes to Tables 1 to 4 (Appendix  2)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Budgetary Documents for the Parliament &
GUS Rocznik Statystyczny  1992 and 1993 for 1991 and 1992.
x  not applicable, irrelevant
not available
internally consolidated
in the banking system,  not included in Table 1
o.w.: of which.
(1]  - Fundusz Ubespieczen Spolecznych
[2] - till 1991: Fundusz Ubezpieczen Spolecznych Rolnikow; from 1992:
Fundusz  Emerytalno-Rentowy
[3] - Fundusz  Pracy
[4]  - Fundusz Alimentacyjny +  Panstwowy Fundusz  Kombatantow
Note:  In  1991,  local government budgets  were  separated  from general
government. The data are not strictly comparable.
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